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We show that, even when the firm and the consumers have same beliefs about the product safety there are incentives for the firm to seek safety certification.
Associate Professor of Marketing Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Joint faculty appointment: Department of Economics, Krieger School of Arts & Sciences Phone: 410-234-9247Email: [email protected] interests: Information disclosure and incentives Competitive marketing strategy Developing markets Shubhranshu Singh, Ph D (Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley; MBA, National University of Singapore, Singapore; MTech and MSc, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India) joined the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School in 2013.
He is an Associate Professor in the research track with expertise in the area of competitive marketing strategy and specific interest in developing markets.
Further, we show that unilateral anti-corruption controls, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, on a U. firm seeking business in a corrupt foreign market can actually increase the firm’s profits.1.
"Disclosure Contest: Revealing Own and Rival Information" (with Ganesh Iyer)Abstract: Firms may have valuation-relevant private information about own and rival’s products.
Intuitively and as expected, a sufficiently large monitoring of the agent eradicates corruption.
Interestingly, however, increasing the monitoring from an initial low level can backfire, making the agent more likely to select a non-deserving firm.
Interestingly, the effect of reputational payoff on under-testing is non-monotonic, and the desire to appear of high type leads to under-testing only when the reputational payoff is intermediate.
Our results also suggest a more altruistic expert may be more likely to engage in under-testing.
The expert is impurely altruistic in that she cares about both the client’s utility and her own reputational payoff that depends on the peer perception about her diagnostic ability.
The decision of whether to perform the test, which is costly for the client, provides the expert with an opportunity to influence that perception.